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This paper examines the usage of reverse mortgages among mortgage borrowers, as well as 
rejected applicants for new mortgage credit who are age 62+. We find that 17-27 percent of actual 
and rejected borrowers would have qualified for a HECM reverse mortgage, or nine to 14 times 
the size of the actual HECM market. The existence of a large number of seniors with an existing 
mortgage or taking out a new mortgage with quite high LTVs (57-65%, depending on the product) 
suggests that many seniors do, in fact utilize home equity in order to fund their retirement. Yet 
they choose products that require monthly payments lasting decades into retirement and rising as 
a share of (declining) income as they age. We consider a number of possible explanations for why 
seniors in the US do not spend home equity and rely on loans with high payments, including 
precautionary savings for health shocks, bequest motives, high costs of reverse mortgages, and the 
lack of brand name institutions in the reverse mortgage business.  
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The Market for Reverse Mortgages among Older Americans 
 
Introduction 
Reverse mortgages have long been viewed with skepticism by some retirees, financial 
planners, and financial institutions. Potential concerns are many, including high costs, dicey sales 
practices, and the potential of retirees to lose their home if things go badly. Interestingly, the same 
concerns about reverse mortgages or similar products (‘equity release’ options) seem to persist in 
many countries with very different institutions and financial systems. 
Yet the need to access additional retirement assets like home equity has never been 
stronger. Academics and researchers lament the lack of adequate retirement savings and growing 
debt among older Americans. Media headlines such as ‘Over 60 with Decades Left on the 
Mortgage: The New Retirement Math’ in the Wall Street Journal (Rexrode 2020) are common. 
Recent studies by the Urban Institute, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and a number of 
academics point to the increase in the number of American households entering retirement age 
with a mortgage and growing average mortgage balances, both in real dollars and as a share of 
home equity.1 For example, the proportion of older adults entering retirement with mortgage debt 
has more than doubled from 20 percent in 1992, to more than 40 percent in 2016.2 This is occurring 
even as ever fewer households have a traditional pension and retirees have shrinking 401(k) and 
other retirement savings. The economic and financial shrinkage associated with COVID-19 will 
only make this problem worse. 
Yet the growth in housing debt in the US can also be seen in a different light—as evidence 
that older households are effectively consuming home equity in retirement. Many older households 
use traditional mortgage instruments like a Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOC), second lien, or 




existing debt in place for longer, retirees are avoiding the increase in home equity that used to take 
place in previous generations, effectively further reducing savings.  
Of course, the problem with using traditional mortgage debt to fund retirement is that such 
debt must be paid back at the same time as many households are retiring and facing sharp drops in 
their income. Research by Englehardt and Eriksen (2019) shows that elderly homeowners with a 
mortgage face housing expense burdens that mirror those of renters, with a growing share of 
retirees spending 30 to 50 percent or more of their income on housing expenses. One in four older 
adults engages in expensive credit card behaviors, including paying only the minimum balance, 
paying over the limit fees, and using credit cards for cash advance (Lusardi et al. 2020). Rates of 
personal bankruptcy are increasing more quickly for older adults than any other age group in the 
US (Fisher 2019; Li and White 2020). It is perhaps not surprising that a higher level of debt—
particularly non-housing consumer debt—is associated with increased stress among older adults 
(Haurin et al. 2019). While many workers report an offsetting desire to retire later, data shows that 
few elderly retire as late as they planned to at younger ages.4 
For most retirees, home equity is the largest single asset they bring into retirement, even 
after subtracting mortgage debt. Nearly 80 percent of adults age 65+ own their homes, and most 
still own those free and clear. Using data from the 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances, Moulton 
and Haurin (2019) estimated that the median homeowner age 62 and older held more wealth in the 
form of home equity than in financial assets:  $139,000 in home equity, compared to $101,800 in 
financial assets.  
Finding a way to responsibly use home equity would seem to be a priority. Yet it has also 
been an elusive goal. One exception is the United Kingdom, where Equity Release options have 




borrowers over age 55 is an equity release product. Relative to the population of retirees, the 
effective market in the UK is nearly five times the size of the US. Similarly, Canada has seen a 
sharp rise in the use of reverse mortgages. One reason for the growth in equity release products in 
the UK is that mortgage originators are asked to ensure older borrowers are able to afford mortgage 
payments using retirement income, not just current income at the time of the mortgage. This has 
pushed mortgage originators to raise the option of equity release products with older borrowers, 
and is likely an important factor behind their increasing use. As well, UK financial planners do not 
face some of the regulatory restrictions in place in the US and often discuss equity release and 
other options to use home equity. Also, unlike the US, they can also earn a commission from the 
sale of such products. 
In this paper we explore the US reverse mortgage market and the reasons behind its 
apparent failure to help fund retirement. We do so while also exploring how older borrowers use 
home equity and various types of mortgages to finance their retirement. To do this, we access data 
from the 2018 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), which, for the first time, includes 
significantly expanded data such as the type of mortgage, age of borrowers, interest rate and costs 
for each loan, and the lender. Lenders must also provide information on rejected applicants. We 
can separately identify reverse mortgages and compare them to other types of cash-out borrowing. 
We also explore other types of mortgages taken out by seniors, including traditional refinancing 
and purchase mortgages. 
The results show that Americans age 62+ access a wide variety of sources to borrow against 
their principal residence. In 2018, only 33,000 originated reverse mortgages were reported in 
HMDA, versus 609,000 originated equity extraction loans such as HELOCs, cash-out refinancing, 




payments, typically for 15 to 30 years. An additional 688,000 older Americans originated a 
mortgage for home purchase or a refinancing, many of which will require payments beyond age 
90. Our analysis focuses on the HECM program, a US government-insured reverse mortgage that 
represents 94 percent of all reported reverse mortgage originations. 
After documenting the extent to which home equity borrowing is important for many 
retirees, we examine the barriers to accessing home equity for older adults and find that denial due 
to excessive debt payments is a bigger problem for the elderly than for younger potential 
borrowers. Our data show that more than 50 percent of older adults denied HELOC or second liens 
in 2018 were denied because they could not afford the monthly mortgage payment, compared to 
41 percent who were denied for credit reasons. An estimated 70 percent of older adults denied 
HELOC and second liens had debt to income ratios in excess of 41 percent. By contrast, for 
homeowners under the age of 46, only 35 percent were denied a HELOC or second lien due to 
affordability (nearly half being denied due to poor credit). At an age where retirement (and thus a 
loss of income) is increasingly likely, the large amount of existing debt appears to be a problem 
for a large number of older homeowners. 
Given that high debt payments are a barrier to affordability for the elderly, we consider 
reasons that no-payment loans like a reverse mortgage represent such as small share of total 
borrowing. For example, simulations show that between 26 and 36 percent of rejected HELOC 
and second lien applicants likely could have accessed a reverse mortgage (n=54,000 to 74,000). 
Similarly, between 28 and 40 percent of approved HELOC and second lien borrowers could have 
used a reverse mortgage (n=77,000 to 108,000). Maybe not surprising, given the large amount of 
borrower for many older applicants, is that the principal reason that reverse mortgages couldn’t 




mortgage because they needed to borrow too much money to qualify. Initial loan-to-value ratios 
for reverse mortgages are much lower than for traditional mortgages because of the negative 
amortization of the balance when a borrower is not making mortgage payments. 
Next, we explore various reasons why reverse mortgages may not be used more frequently. 
Our analysis considers four potential reasons that older borrowers already considering home equity 
borrowing do not choose a reverse mortgage, including product reputation, higher costs, bequest 
motives, and regulatory barriers. We also discuss other motives for not using home equity among 
those who don’t explore a new mortgage, including precautionary savings and the more general 
puzzle of why many retirees fail to spend down other assets in retirement (Poterba, et. al. 2011, 
for example). We conclude that while high product costs may be a barrier for some potential 
borrowers, the poor product reputation and regulatory barriers also play an important role, 
particularly in discouraging the participation of mainstream financial institutions which might be 
able to bring distribution efficiencies, lower costs, and retirement advice that incorporates home 
equity into financial plans. 
 
The Market for Reverse Mortgages and Equity Release Products 
Equity release options in the US and abroad. A reverse mortgage is a loan that allows an older 
borrower to borrow against the value of the home without required payments. In most countries 
including the US, a borrower can take some up-front cash and the balance of the loan either as a 
line of credit (LOC or ‘drawdown’) or with fixed monthly payments (tenure payments). A recent 
survey of selected global equity release originators by Ernst & Young Global Limited (EY 2020) 
summarizes products available across the world. According to the survey, most borrowers take a 




borrowers to access additional funds as they desire, similar to a HELOC. In the US, borrowers can 
make optional payments and can deduct the portion of the payment that is applied to interest in the 
same way as a traditional (forward) mortgage. Since the loan balance is expected to grow over 
time as interest accrues, the origination loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of a reverse mortgage is typically 
much lower than for a traditional mortgage, and the product is restricted to older borrowers who 
have a shorter expected time in the property. Common minimum age ranges between 55 (UK and 
Canada) to 62 (most often in the US) or 65 (Germany). The amount of proceeds available typically 
rises for older borrowers. 
Reverse mortgages are not the only product that allows borrowers to use home equity in 
retirement. They fit inside a larger category of ‘equity release’ products. In some countries, 
particularly Italy, Germany, and France, there is an active market in home reversions (or viagers), 
in which the owner ‘sells’ some or all of the future sale proceeds of the home in return for an up-
front lump sum or annuity payment and the right to live in the home as long as he/she lives.  
Equity release products have a number of insurance features that should be appealing for 
retirees and allow them to hedge risks that might otherwise materially impact their financial 
position in retirement. This is because the lender/purchaser is giving up-front cash, in return for a 
future uncertain payoff from the sale of the home. In the vast majority of countries (exceptions 
include Spain and Germany), the borrower or his/her estate is never liable for more than the home 
is worth. Thus, if the borrower lives longer than expected or home prices fall, the lender/purchaser 
bears the risk that the present value of eventual proceeds will be below the amount of money 
advanced to the borrower at the underwritten cost of capital. Few other products exist that allow a 




Who can benefit from home equity release? The most obvious beneficiaries of using home 
equity in retirement are those for whom few other options exist. For example, Cocco and Lopes 
(2019) have simulations that suggest that reverse mortgage demand should be the highest among 
those with low levels of non-housing wealth relative to home equity, who have a weak bequest 
motive, and who have high levels of other pre-existing debt.  The importance of pre-existing debt 
is consistent with prior empirical research finding that a large proportion of RM borrowers use 
RMs to pay off debt. 
Some studies look to calculate the share of borrowers with a relatively large amount of 
home equity relative to total assets or income, finding an appreciable minority of seniors have little 
income or financial assets and a comparably large amount of home equity. For example, Goodman 
et al. (2017) estimated that as many as 2.5 million to 4.5 million senior households (10 to 17 
percent of the 26 million senior homeowners) could benefit from a vehicle to tap into home equity, 
including a reverse mortgage.  Mayer (2017) showed that almost one-quarter of senior households 
have at least $50,000 in home equity and less than $50,000 in financial assets in 2012. Moulton 
and Haurin (2016) estimated that nearly one in five of older homeowners held less than $10,000 
in financial assets, but had at least $40,000 in home equity. As we show below, originations of 
reverse mortgages represent a relatively small share of such potential demand.  
An alternative approach to access home equity is through home sale, yet most older adults 
express strong attachment to their homes. In a 2018 survey, 76 percent of respondents age 50+ 
indicated a desire to remain in their current home as long as possible (Binette and Vasold 2018).  
These preferences are consistent with data: for example, from 2012 to 2014, only 1.8 percent of 
homeowners age 65+ extracted equity by selling their homes (Goodman, Kaul, and Zhu 2017).  Of 




home of lesser value, allowing for liquidation of home equity (Begley and Chan 2019). Those who 
did sell their homes tended to have higher incomes and more non-housing financial wealth 
(Englehardt and Eriksen 2019).  
An important reason that homeowners do not sell their homes is that their retirement 
consumption is tied to the home’s value, and owning a home provides a hedge against outliving 
their assets. That is, the home is not simply a financial asset that can be tapped at will, but it is also 
an asset that pays a ‘dividend’ in the form of imputed rent. Thus, selling the home creates a 
challenge: how to invest the proceeds from a sale to ensure sufficient returns to pay rent over the 
remaining lifetime. Seniors who rent bear the risk of running out of money if they live a long time 
or financial returns are not what they expect. This might explain why homeownership rates across 
most developed countries peak at age 65-74 around 75 to 90 percent, regardless of the mortgage 
finance or pension systems (Goodman and Mayer 2018).  
Accordingly, there appears to be an appreciable number of older borrowers who fit into 
categories that might benefit from taking an equity release product like a reverse mortgage. Some 
are the traditional ‘house rich, cash poor’ households or those who want to eliminate mortgage 
payments. Others might want to access liquidity from home equity rather than selling financial 
assets, effectively ending up with a portfolio that becomes increasingly concentrated in home 
equity with age.  
Market size and growth of equity release in the US, UK, and Canada. In the aggregate, the 
total value of home equity for seniors is quite large. In the US, home equity seniors aged 62 had a 
total of $7.54 trillion in Q1 2020 (National Reverse Mortgage Lenders Association (NRMLA) 




according to Haurin and Moulton (2017). By comparison, the aggregate value of equity release 
products is much smaller. 
While aggregate data on equity release products in many countries is difficult to obtain, we 
can summarize the reverse mortgage market in US and compare to two growing markets including 
Canada and the UK.5 The number of reverse mortgages in the US is small and sensitive to market 
and policy dynamics affecting who can borrow and the proceeds available. In the UK and Canada, 
equity release markets are much larger as a share of the elderly population. 
For the US, we examine the market for HECM reverse mortgages, or loans insured by the 
FHA, an agency of the US Department of Housing and Urban Development. While there is also a 
small private-label reverse mortgage program, over this time period, it is estimated that 96 to 100 
percent of all reverse mortgages were HECMs, and systematic data were not available prior to 
2018.6  
Figure 1 charts the volume of HECM reverse mortgages since the program became 
permanent in 1998.  As is apparent, the growth in the number of reverse mortgages (LHS axis, 
white bars) in the US has been hump-shaped and has suffered an appreciable decline in the last 
decade. Right before and after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, reverse mortgage production 
peaked at nearly 115,000 reverse mortgages, accounting for under 0.5 percent of older 
homeowners. With about 10,000 people turning 65 every day in the US, the share taking out a 
reverse mortgage is still well under one percent of the eligible population during most years of the 
sample. The growth during the financial crisis is not surprising; seniors who watched their stock 
portfolios collapse seemed ever more willing to turn to their homes to help finance retirement, 




during the mid-2000s, leaving many older borrowers with relatively big mortgage payments that 
they could eliminate with a reverse mortgage. 
Figure 1 here 
After the 2008 peak, reverse mortgage originations plummeted over more than a decade, 
with tighter underwriting, lower borrowing proceeds, and the exit of many brand name originators. 
Until 2014, the FHA did not require financial underwriting for borrowers.  While there are no 
required mortgage payments for a reverse mortgage, borrowers must still pay property taxes and 
insurance to be in compliance, and an appreciable number of borrowers from 2009-2012 took out 
full draws and were left with no money to cover these costs. This led to a sharp increase in defaults 
and FHA-required foreclosures on borrowers unable to make property tax and homeowner’s 
insurance (T&I) payments, with attendant poor publicity. With these and other challenges, larger 
financial institutions such as Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and MetLife exited the reverse 
mortgage business.  
The increase in defaults and foreclosures and sharp declines in home values led the FHA 
to re-assess its underwriting and curtail available proceeds for borrowers as a share of home value.  
The maximum amount of proceeds for a HECM is called the ‘Principal Limit’ or the share of home 
value that can be used as a borrowing base. To protect itself, the FHA lowered the principal limit 
factor (PLF)—the proportion of home equity that can be borrowed, similar to an LTV—
substantially between 2012 and 2017. While the average home value for HECM borrowers (called 
Maximum Claim Amount, or MCA) grew 30 percent between 2009 and 2019, the Principal Limit 
did not grow at all.7 In addition, in 2015, the FHA limited the amount of money that a borrower 
could get to 60 percent of the PLF, unless the borrower had a mortgage or other required property 




cover these ‘mandatory obligations’ plus an additional 10 percent (capped at 100% of the PL). The 
effective reduction in proceeds available to borrowers, combined with the exit of brand-name 
financial institutions, led to a sharp decline in the number of HECM mortgages originated. 
By comparison, originations of equity release products in Canada and the UK followed a 
very different pattern, more than doubling since 2013. In the UK, equity release offerings increased 
from £1 bn in 2013 to £3bn in 2017, with a further 32 percent growth to more than £4 bn by 2019.8  
As well, equity release mortgages represent an estimated 36 percent of all mortgages for borrowers 
over age 55 in 2018, doubling their share from the previous decade. A total of 46,000 equity release 
plans were originated in 2018 versus fewer than 42,000 in the US, despite the US having almost 
five times the number of retirees.  While total volume in 2019 was flat with 2018, the membership 
in the Equity Release Council almost doubled and, prior to COVID-19, the industry expected 
continued growth in 2020.  
In Canada, HomeEquity Bank, the sole seller of reverse mortgages until recently, reported a 
record $820 mm (CAD) up from $309 mm (CAD) five years earlier. As in the UK, mortgages are 
available for borrowers aged 55 and above, although the bulk of originations are for those over age 
65. In both the UK and Canada, lenders advertise widely in the media. In the UK, equity release 
products are offered by some of the largest life insurance companies.  
 
Home Equity and the Market for Reverse Mortgages 
Reverse mortgage originations in the US. The current number of outstanding reverse mortgages 
in the US is small, estimated to be below two percent of older homeowners.9 In general, it is 
difficult to measure the home equity market for older adults. Surveys such as the Health and 




reported data on loan balances. These data are good for tracking trends in the stock of mortgage 
debt held by older homeowners, but they are less useful for examining new originations and, in 
particular, the share of reverse mortgages versus other mortgage products. Researchers also use 
consumer credit panel datasets to track trends in home equity borrowing among older adults over 
time (Moulton et al. 2019; Brown et. al. 2020). Yet credit data do not include borrower-specific 
information on home values and do not include important information about loan terms and costs. 
Further, reverse mortgages are not reported in credit data because they do not require borrowers 
to make payments. 
Below, we examine data on the vast majority of new mortgages originated in the US using 
the 2018 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) Loan Application Register (LAR).  Under 
HMDA, lenders are required to collect and report specific information about mortgage applications 
acted upon and loans purchased during the prior calendar year. Beginning in 2018, new reporting 
requirements went into effect that required most lenders to report on mortgages structured as open-
ended lines of credit, such as HELOCs and reverse mortgages that were previously only voluntarily 
reported (CFPB 2019).10 Importantly, the 2018 HMDA data includes new information on both 
federally insured HECMs and proprietary reverse mortgages, as well as the age of borrower, so 
we can compare various types of borrowing done by seniors. 
The 2018 HMDA data allows us to compare the characteristics of applicants and borrowers 
of reverse mortgages to the characteristics of mortgage applicants and borrowers for other types 
of loans. The goal is twofold: first, to understand the characteristics of reverse mortgage borrowers; 
and second, to compare reverse mortgage borrowers to applicants for all other mortgage debt taken 
out by potential borrowers aged 62 and older who might otherwise have been eligible to take out 




Data Description. We begin by restricting the HMDA database to those observations where the 
applicant or co-applicant is age 62+, as we wish to focus on older adults who would otherwise be 
eligible for a reverse mortgage. To avoid double counting, we exclude loans that were simply 
purchased by another institution during the reporting period. We further restrict the sample to loans 
for single family, owner-occupied properties, excluding investment properties and second homes. 
These restrictions result in a sample of 2,510,080 loan applications, of which 1,329,505 resulted 
in loan originations during the 2018 period.   
 Table 1 provides a breakdown of observations by loan type and loan outcome. We separate 
loan observations into seven different mortgage types. The first three mortgage types are reverse 
mortgages, including ‘traditional HECMs’, HECMs used to purchase a property (‘HECMs for 
Purchase’), and non-HECM proprietary reverse mortgages (‘Other Reverse Mortgages’). Prior to 
the 2008 housing crisis, there was a nascent market for proprietary reverse mortgages, but this 
market more or less disappeared after 2008. In the last several years, a small proprietary reverse 
mortgage market developed, but it became more substantial in 2018 when several lenders began 
offering the product. Proprietary reverse mortgages are mostly concentrated among higher value 
homes that exceed the property value limits for a HECM12 or for condominiums that do not qualify 
for the FHA’s HECM program.  
Table 1 here 
The other four categories represent different types of traditional (or forward) mortgages; 
that is, mortgages that require a monthly payment and must be paid off over a fixed term. Two 
categories involve the ability for a borrower to take out cash. The first category includes home 
equity lines of credit and loans. HELOCs include new loans structured as a line of credit, where 




credit line for 10 years, followed by a payback period, usually 15 years, where the borrower must 
pay back the outstanding proceeds. The cost of originating a HELOC is quite low and HELOC 
borrowers tend to have very good credit. ‘Second liens’ are loans that are defined as second liens 
excluding lines of credit and loans with a purpose of refinancing. These loans typically have a 
fixed rate and payoff period and are often given to borrowers with riskier credit and have higher-
than-average interest rates. The second category of equity extraction loans includes first 
mortgages. ‘Cash-out refinancing’ is defined to include loans originated for the purpose of cash-
out refinancing that are not structured as a line of credit and are typically paid back over 15-30 
years. ‘First liens not for purchase’ are closed liens in first position that are not for the purpose of 
refinancing or for home purchase. 
The remaining two types of mortgages do not involve the borrower obtaining additional 
cash. ‘Refinance no cash’ loans are defined to include both closed and open lines of credit for the 
stated purpose of refinancing without cash-out, excluding loans for the purchase of a home. 
Finally, ‘Purchase mortgages’ are closed-end loans with the stated purpose of home purchase. In 
both cases, the bulk of such mortgages involved fixed rates (although some are also hybrid ARMs) 
and a payback period that is usually 30-years, although some traditional mortgages may have a 
shorter 15-year payback period. 
 Of the modes of extracting home equity, HELOC and second liens are slightly more 
common in 2008 than cash-out refinancing or first liens not for purchase. Both options are quite a 
bit more prevalent than HECMs 
Reasons for loan denial: Older versus younger borrowers. Table 1 also compares the 
proportion of applications denied or approved by the lender, as well as those considered incomplete 




more than one-third of older applicants in 2018 being denied. About one-fourth of cash-out 
refinancing and first lien mortgages were denied.  Notably, having a weak credit history or high 
debt to income (DTI) ratio were the top reasons for denial among these applicants, with more than 
half of HELOC denials due to an inability to afford the monthly payments (e.g., high DTI).  By 
contrast, reverse mortgage applications were less likely to be denied, with primary reasons being 
related to the collateral value of the property or insufficient cash to cover required costs.  
 These differences in reasons for loan denial make sense, given that reverse mortgages carry 
different criteria for underwriting than forward mortgages. There is no required monthly 
repayment of a reverse mortgage, and thus there is no additional debt to income burden from a 
reverse mortgage. Beginning in 2015, HECM borrowers must demonstrate the ability to pay 
ongoing property tax and insurance payments or have sufficient home equity to set aside funds to 
pay these expenses in an escrow-type account at the time of loan closing (Moulton and Haurin 
2019). The primary barrier to obtaining a reverse mortgage is not poor credit or lack of income, 
but lack of sufficient home equity (Moulton et al. 2017). Any existing mortgage debt on a home 
at the time of application for a reverse mortgage must be paid off with the proceeds of the reverse 
mortgage or in cash at closing. 
 To give additional perspective on the reasons that seniors are turned down for mortgage 
credit, Figure 2 compares reasons for denial of mortgage applications by applicant age, including 
applicants age 45 and younger, age 46 to 61, and age 62 and older.  Here, it is clear that inability 
to afford the monthly payment is a more substantial barrier to originating a mortgage for older 
adults than it is for younger cohorts. For example, more than 50 percent of older adults denied 




only 35 percent of those age 45 and younger. For younger applicants, poor credit is a more common 
reason for denial across all loan types.    
Figure 2 here. 
 We next consider the proportion of mortgage applicants with DTI ratios greater than 41 
percent, which is a typical maximum DTI for underwriting.  Figure 3 compares older and younger 
applicants by loan type, including both those with originated loans and those with loans that were 
denied. The proportion of older applicants with high DTI ratios is striking—70 percent of older 
applicants denied HELOC or second liens had DTIs greater than 41 percent. Across all loan types, 
a higher share of older applicants—both originated and denied—have high DTIs compared to 
younger applicants. High debt incurred at younger ages appears to be an appreciable barrier to 
additional borrowing or consumer home equity at older ages. At an age where income will 
eventually fall as applicants start to retire, debt burdens remain quite high. 
Figure 3 here. 
Characteristics of older borrowers. Table 2 summarizes the loan and borrower characteristics 
for originated reverse mortgage loans reported in the 2018 HMDA data, compared to loan and 
borrower characteristics for traditional mortgage originations to borrowers age 62+ in the 2018 
HMDA data. These data include information for 30,898 HECM loan originations, of which 28,946 
were structured as traditional HECMs and 1,952 as HECMs to purchase a home.13 An additional 
1,952 non-HECM proprietary reverse mortgages are reported in the 2018 HMDA data. 
Table 2 here 
The loan amount reported in the HMDA data for a reverse mortgage is the initial principal 
limit (IPL), or the maximum amount of home equity available to a borrower based on the 




limit factor (PLF), which is the maximum LTV ratio at origination. The PLF is multiplied by the 
value of the property or the limit set by FHA, whichever is lower, to determine the initial principal 
limit (IPL).14 In 2018, the property value limit was $679,650. Borrowers with homes worth more 
than the limit may have access to a larger share of their home equity from a proprietary reverse 
mortgage. 
The average loan amounts for traditional HECMs ($165,751) and HECMs for purchase 
($174,918) are much lower than the average loan amount of $703,735 for proprietary reverse 
mortgages. This is not surprising, given that the average property value of proprietary reverse 
mortgage borrowers in 2018 was $1.66 million, compared with an average home value of $358,011 
for traditional HECMs and $362,701 for HECMs used to purchase a home. The average HECM 
borrower had a slightly higher loan to value ratio of 0.48, compared to 0.44 for proprietary reverse 
mortgage borrowers. In 2018, the average interest rate for HECM borrowers was about two 
percentage points lower than the rate for proprietary reverse mortgage borrowers.  
With regard to demographic characteristics, traditional HECM borrowers were more likely 
to be Black or Hispanic, compared to HECM for purchase or other proprietary reverse mortgage 
borrowers. They were also more likely to be single, to have lower income to underwrite the loan, 
and be located in lower income census tracts—although still slightly above the median income for 
the MSA.  Compared to either type of HECM borrower, proprietary reverse mortgage borrowers 
tend to be older and from higher income census tracts as a percent of the MSA median income. 
Next we compare reverse mortgage borrowers to those who take other types of mortgages. The 
average property value of $433,561 for HELOCs and second liens and $393,734 for cash-out 
refinancing or new first liens not for purchase is higher than the average traditional HECM 




$108,918 is smaller than the average loan amount of HECM borrowers. It is important to note that 
an appreciable share of the HELOC and second loan borrowers held existing first mortgages, as 
the combined LTV for all mortgages on the property of 0.55 is considerably higher than the LTV 
of 0.30 for the HELOC or second loan by itself.   
The average interest rate of HELOC and second loans of 5.93 percent is a bit higher than 
the 4.8 percent interest rate on HECM loans, which becomes 5.3 percent when we add the 0.5 
percent Mortgage Insurance Premium (MIP) that must also be paid on an FHA-insured HECM. 
This insurance fee also exists for traditional FHA loans, where the MIP is also unreported, but also 
for traditional Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loans with an LTV above 80 percent where there is a 
required private mortgage insurance (PMI) policy. Loan costs are not reported in HMDA for 
reverse mortgages or HELOCs, but they are reported for closed-end forward mortgages, with 
average up-front costs of about $4,500 for cash-out refinancing and purchase mortgages, or about 
two percent of loan proceeds.  
Notably, the average combined loan-to-value ratio for the cash-out loan types ranges 
between 55 (HELOC and second loans) and 63 percent (cash-out refinancing and non-purchase 
first mortgages). This is striking, given the size of mortgage debt owed over a repayment period 
of 25 to 30 years, extending into their 90s and beyond. Such borrowers are taking on mortgage 
payments as a share of home value that are nearly as large as much younger borrowers who have 
a much longer expected working period.  
 Consistent with the perception of having strong credit requirements, HELOC borrowers 
also appear to have higher income characteristics than do reverse mortgage or other cash out 
borrowers. HECM borrowers live in lower income Census tracts (107% of MSA median) versus 




HELOC and second lien borrowers are less likely to be Black or Hispanic (10.5%) than cash-out 
first lien borrowers (15.8%), who are closer to the traditional HECM minority share of 15 percent. 
Strikingly, HECM borrowers are almost twice as likely to be single female (40%) vs approximately 
22 percent of HELOC and second lien borrowers.  
When we examine traditional purchase or refinance mortgages, HECM borrowers have a 
similar share of Black or Hispanic borrowers (13-15%) and also almost double the share of single 
female borrowers. As well, the neighborhoods for refinancing and purchase mortgages have higher 
incomes relative to their MSA compared to HECM Census tracts.  
HECM simulations using 2018 HMDA data. Next, we leverage the HMDA data to estimate a 
series of counterfactual simulations to determine whether applicants in the HMDA data could have 
obtained HECMs instead of the mortgages actually chosen. The simulations focus on the size of 
the loan requested without taking credit into account. In part, this is because we do not observe 
borrower credit indicators across all loan types. Nevertheless, relatively few HECM borrowers are 
rejected due to low credit for two reasons. First, since HECMs do not have required principal and 
interest payments, borrowers must only show the ability to pay property taxes and insurance (T&I), 
a much lower income standard. Second, HECM borrowers with poor credit or low income can 
always choose to take a lower Initial Principal Limit and set aside borrowing proceeds to pay future 
T&I.15 Thus, HECM borrowers can have poor credit or low income and still qualify for the loan. 
To examine eligibility for a HECM, we determine the amount of money a borrower could 
qualify for using the initial Principal Limit Factor (PLF) tables from the HECM program in 2018. 
Inputs to the IPL tables include the age of the youngest borrower and the property value, estimates 
of which are reported in HMDA. For the expected interest rate on a HECM loan, another input 




size requested through a forward mortgage with what we estimate the borrower could have 
obtained with a HECM.  
We run the simulation with two different sets of assumptions regarding the HECM 
expected interest rate and loan costs. The first scenario is a conservative estimate, with the 
maximum permissible loan origination fee and an expected interest rate of 4.75 percent (the 
median rate in 2018). The second scenario relaxes some of these assumptions, waiving the lender 
origination fee and using an expected interest rate of three percent.  
The lower interest rate in the second scenario is important, as borrowers are able to obtain 
the maximum possible proceeds in the PLF table by gaining access to a lower interest rate loan. In 
practice, borrowers who shop around are often able to obtain more preferable terms on a HECM, 
including lower rates and thus higher loan proceeds. As well, lenders are often willing to offer 
borrowers a lower interest rate on their HECMs if the borrowers take more proceeds. This is 
especially true where the lower rate allows a borrower to obtain a HECM when, at a higher rate, 
that borrower would not obtain sufficient proceeds to pay off a previous lien. The second scenario 
would be particularly relevant in times when the 10-year Treasury rate falls below that in 2019, 
when rates peaked above three percent, compared to average rates that were 0.5 to 1.0 percent 
lower in the other years between 2016 and 2019. In 2020, with COVID-19 and recent Fed moves, 
many reverse mortgages are being originated at or near the three percent rate that obtains a 
maximum PLF. Recent experience, along with the data in this paper, suggest that demand for 
reverse mortgages may be quite sensitive to interest rates due to the much larger proceeds available 
in lower interest rate economic environments. 
We conduct the simulations for both originated forward mortgages and for applications for 




preference for borrowing from home equity who were unable to do so through the mortgage type 
selected. The results for originated forward mortgages and for denied applications in Table 3. 
Table 3 here 
To illustrate our approach, consider the case of HELOC and second lien originations in 
Table 3. Based on the age of the youngest borrower and an expected interest rate of 4.75, the 
estimated average PLF is 0.457 (top section of Table). Multiplying this factor by the borrower’s 
property value or the loan limit of $679,650 (whichever is less) results in an average maximum 
HECM loan amount (IPL) of $158,258. Note that reducing the expected interest rate to 3.0 (bottom 
section of table) increases the PLF by nearly 10 percentage points, raising the maximum loan 
amount to $192,299. 
We then calculate the borrower specific up-front costs associated with a HECM, comprised 
of lender origination fees, an up-front mortgage insurance premium charged by HUD, and standard 
closing costs (e.g., appraisal and closing fees). For the simulation at the top of Table 3, we assume 
that the maximum origination fee is assessed by a lender at an average of $4,711 for HELOC and 
second lien borrowers in our sample.16 We waive the origination fee in the bottom of Table 3, as 
this fee is assessed at a lender’s discretion and lenders might choose not to charge it for borrowers 
who take large proceeds and also comparison shop on prices. The up-front mortgage insurance 
premium is currently set by HUD at two percent of the home value, amounting to $6,951 for the 
average HELOC or second lien borrower in our sample. We also include an estimated $2,500 for 
standard closing costs,17 resulting in total estimated up-front costs of $14,162 for the average 
HELOC borrower (top section), or $9,451 with the origination fee waived (bottom section). 
It is important to note that the mortgage insurance premium for a HECM buys some 




recourse, which means that borrowers, their heirs, and lenders are not responsible for anything 
owed on the HECM balance beyond the value of the home. By contrast, for HELOCs, borrowers 
in most states bear personal liability for any negative equity. Personal liability is a feature of almost 
all second liens and some first lien mortgages, depending on the state. As well, HELOCs are 
subject to being suspended in an environment of falling home prices, whereas the HECM LOC 
will not be cut if home prices decline (although the LOC can be suspended if a borrower fails to 
meet other reverse mortgage obligations such as making timely payment of property taxes and 
insurance, adequately maintaining the home, and living in the home as the borrower’s primary 
residence.) 
To estimate the total loan amount from the HECM, we add together the borrower’s 
requested loan amount for the forward mortgage, any existing mortgage debt held by the borrower 
in addition to the new loan being requested (e.g., the balance on a first mortgage for borrowers 
requesting a second lien or HELOC), and the estimated HECM closing costs.  We then divide this 
amount by the borrower’s property value or the MCA (whichever is lower) to get the estimated 
LTV if the borrower were to obtain a HECM. If the estimated LTV is less than the estimated PLF, 
the borrower could obtain a HECM. For HELOC and second lien borrowers, the ratio averages 
0.643 (top panel) or 0.627 (bottom panel), which exceeds the estimated maximum PLF by an 
average of 0.186 (top panel) or 0.072 (bottom panel). At an expected interest rate of 4.75 percent 
and with the full origination fee, we estimate that 28 percent of HELOC and second lien borrowers 
could have obtained a HECM.  At an expected rate of three percent with no origination fee, this 
proportion increases to about 40 percent of HELOC and second lien originations. 
Across all loan types, we estimate that about 17 to 27 percent of older adults originating 




forward mortgage, corresponding to a total of 225,000 to 350,000 older adults.  A key reason that 
a majority of borrowers may be choosing a traditional mortgage is simply that they are borrowing 
too much money to choose a HECM. In other words, the large required debt means that a HECM 
is not an option for at least three quarters of older mortgage borrowers in 2018. 
Equally interesting is that roughly the same proportion of rejected borrowers may have 
qualified for a HECM as for actual borrowers. The simulations in the right-hand columns of Table 
3 indicate that 17 to 25 percent of denied forward mortgage borrowers would have sufficient home 
equity to originate a HECM at their requested loan amount, corresponding to 98,000 to 147,000 
older adults. For the rejected borrowers, a HECM would have made the difference between getting 
a mortgage and not, while at the same time eliminating the required mortgage payment. 
Next, we examine the characteristics of forward mortgage applicants who originated or 
were rejected for loans, but who had sufficient home equity to obtain a HECM for the requested 
loan amount at an expected interest rate of 3.0 percent and no origination fee.18 Table 4 reports 
summary statistics for originated loans (left-hand columns) and rejected borrowers (right-hand 
columns). Both groups had relatively lower LTVs than average for the loan type, which is not 
surprising given that the HECM LTVs are lower than those of other mortgages that require 
principal and interest payments. 
 Nonetheless, a HECM could have helped many of the borrowers and rejected applicants. 
For rejected borrowers, nearly half were denied the loan because the resulting debt to income ratio 
from having a monthly mortgage payment would be too high. Based on HMDA characteristics, 56 
to 66 percent of the rejected applicants would have a DTI of 41 percent or more if they obtained a 
forward mortgage. Even among those who took out a new mortgage, 28 to 32 percent had DTIs 




position to have reductions in income as they get older and may be unable to work. Aside from 
having very high debt to income ratios, rejected applicants were also older, more likely to be Black 
or Hispanic, and from lower-income census tracts compared to the full population of forward 
mortgage borrowers. 
Table 4 here 
 
Summary of Findings  
In sum, five key findings are worth noting: 1) Older (forward) mortgage borrowers tend to 
be taking on quite a bit of debt, with average loan-to-value ratio of 55 (HELOC or second liens) 
to 78 percent (Purchase mortgage). 2) Mortgage rates are similar for HECMs relative to other cash-
out refinancing and traditional mortgage types, almost all averaging 4.8 to 5.9 percent, although 
reverse mortgages are much more likely to be adjustable vs fixed rate. 3) Reverse mortgage 
borrowers are almost twice as likely to be single women (40%) compared to other older mortgage 
borrowers, have a similar share of minority borrowers, and live in slightly higher income 
communities relative to the MSA median. 4) Only 17 to 27 percent of actual and rejected borrowers 
would have qualified for a HECM, depending on the interest rate and closing costs of the HECM, 
though this would represent 301,000 to 460,000 borrowers, it is still nine to 14 times the size of 
the actual HECM market. Even the number of rejected traditional mortgage borrowers who might 
have obtained a HECM was 2.6 to 3.9 times the actual number of reverse mortgage borrowers. 5) 
A large share of actual and rejected borrowers had very high DTI ratios, with 71 percent of rejected 
borrowers and 40 percent of actual borrowers having a DTI over 36 percent. A HECM could have 




What about older borrowers with an existing mortgage? In other work, Moulton and Haurin 
(2019) examined the potential size of the HECM market among older Americans with a mortgage. 
They found that in 2016, at least half of existing older homeowners with a mortgage would have 
been able to take out a HECM, at least five million households in total. This much larger group 
was still making mortgage payments, although only a minority appeared to have a DTI as high as 
the new mortgage borrowers in our sample, above. 
 
Why Older People Do Not Use Reverse Mortgages 
The large proportion of older adults for whom home equity is their primary source of 
wealth, combined with growing levels of consumer and mortgage debt held by older adults—and  
resulting increases in their debt to income burden—presents a puzzle: why do older adults in the 
US not turn to reverse mortgages more often?  In this section, we consider several reasons for why 
this may be the case, including those that make people reluctant to spend down home equity 
generally in retirement, as well as those that are specific to the institutional features of the 
American reverse mortgage market. 
Reluctance to consume home equity in retirement. It is well established that people tend to not 
spend down their wealth in retirement as would be predicted by a simple life-cycle hypothesis 
(Modigliani and Brumberg 1954; De Nardi et al. 2010, 2016b; Lockwood 2018). Housing wealth 
is no exception, and in fact it tends to be the last asset consumed, typically only near the end of 
life following a major health event or the death of a spouse (Englehardt and Eriksen 2019; Mayer 
2017; Poterba, Venti and Wise 2011, 2017; Venti and Wise 1990, 2004). Financial wealth is more 
liquid and accessible than housing wealth, without the transaction costs of selling the home or 




wealth before housing wealth, including housing wealth being treated more favorably by tax policy 
when left as a bequest.  
The economics literature generally suggests two interrelated reasons for holding on to 
wealth in retirement: (1) precautionary savings for uncertain health costs, including long-term care; 
and (2) bequest motives. Importantly, these motivations do not necessarily preclude borrowing 
from home equity in retirement. For example, retaining home equity as precautionary savings for 
major health expenses suggests that homeowners anticipate being able to liquidate home equity 
when a health shock occurs. Nevertheless, such motivations may help explain the timing and 
nature of home equity consumption in retirement.  
Health costs in retirement can be considerable. While the majority of older adults receive 
Medicare, nearly 20 percent of health expenditures are paid for as out-of-pocket costs (De Nardi 
et al. 2016a).  Recent estimates indicate that the average 65-year old man or woman needs $72,000 
or $93,000 (respectively) to have a 50 percent chance of being able to cover necessary health 
expenses in retirement; for those who experience major health shocks, this could exceed $350,000 
(Fronstin and VanDerhei 2017). Further, more than half of older adults will require long term care 
in a nursing home or at home prior to death (Favreault and Dey 2015; Hurd, Michaud, and 
Rohwedder 2014), with average lifetime costs of $133,700 in 2015 dollars (Favreault and Dey 
2015). 
Despite these risks, few households purchase long-term care insurance; instead viewing 
home equity as precautionary saving to cover such costs if they do arise (Costa-Font et al. 2018; 
Davidoff 2010). Indeed, evidence indicates that home equity is one of the main resources used to 
pay for long term care in the US (Costa-Font et al. 2018), with Medicaid covering costs for 60 




homeowners to hold assets in the form of home equity rather than as liquid wealth. To qualify for 
Medicaid, households must spend down their financial assets to a minimum set by states, typically 
around $2,000, but home equity is typically exempt from eligibility thresholds (Ricks 2018). 
Therefore, older adults with a high probability of needing long-term care (and potentially to rely 
on Medicaid to pay for such services) may have a strategic incentive to spend down or transfer 
financial wealth, and to save remaining wealth in the form of home equity.  
In line with a precautionary savings motive, recent studies document a decline in home 
equity after a health shock (Gilligan et al. 2018; Gupta et al. 2018; Poterba et al. 2018), with home 
equity being second only to formal health insurance for financing health related consumption after 
a health shock in later life (Dalton and LaFave 2017).  The ability to access home equity is also 
linked to better health outcomes. In an analysis of cancer patients, Gupta et al. (2018) found that 
cancer patients who borrowed from home equity were 23 percent more likely to perform necessary 
treatments and had lower rates of mortality than did cancer patients that did not borrow from home 
equity.  
In addition, a desire to leave a bequest to heirs may prevent spending from home equity in 
retirement; in fact, this need not be a separate motivation and can actually reinforce precautionary 
savings. For example, adults who intend to leave a bequest but are uncertain of their future health 
risks may prefer to self-insure through precautionary savings rather than purchase long-term care 
insurance or spend down their financial assets to qualify for Medicaid (Lockwood 2018). 
Whether intended or unintended, a large proportion of older adults do leave home equity 
to their heirs when they die: bequests from home equity totaled an estimated $90 to $100 billion 
per year from 1992 to 2014 (Englehardt and Erikson 2019). Several economists have estimated 




factors that might lead older adults to retain wealth in retirement (Ameriks et al. 2011; De Nardi 
et al. 2010, 2016; Lockwood 2018; Nakajima and Telyukova 2020). These models generally 
indicate that, while bequests are certainly an important factor in explaining wealth holding, they 
do not explain everything. For instance, Nakajima and Telyukova (2020) estimated that bequest 
motives explained about seven to 28 percent of median net worth in retirement, depending on the 
individual’s age, well below the amount of home equity left to heirs at death.  
Structural models estimating demand for reverse mortgages predict higher home equity use 
for those with weaker bequest motives, elders who have low levels of financial wealth relative to 
housing wealth, and for those with relatively high levels of pre-existing debt (Cocco and Lopes 
2019; Nakajima and Telyukova 2017). Health expenditures are complicated: on one hand, those 
with high uncertainty regarding future health costs are predicted to retain home equity as 
precautionary savings. Yet those with high health expenditures due to underlying health conditions 
or the onset of a health shock may have a higher demand for borrowing through a reverse mortgage 
to help pay for health-related expenses (Nakajima and Telyukova 2017). 
Despite a general tendency to hold more wealth than would be predicted following a life-
cycle model, as demonstrated above, older adults can and do extract equity in retirement—they 
just use other debt instruments more commonly to do so rather than reverse mortgages. As we 
discussed earlier, this is not the case in some countries like the UK or Canada, where equity release 
products are much more widely used by older borrowers. As well, these countries saw sharp rises 
in the use of equity release through 2019, a pattern similar to the large growth of reverse mortgages 
in the US through 2009, except that the growth in Canada and the UK occurred in an economic 
boom, versus the strong growth in the downturn in the US. The uneven economic pattern combined 




bequest motive or precautionary savings as the main explanation for why US retirees do not choose 
equity release more often. This raises questions about the institutional features of reverse 
mortgages and the market in the US that may impede their use. 
Institutional features of reverse mortgages in the US. One longstanding claim is that high costs 
limit demand for reverse mortgages; in particular, there are substantial costs associated with taking 
out these loans (Lucas 2015; Nakajima and Telyukova 2017). Traditional reverse mortgages do 
carry up-front costs that are larger than up-front costs associated with other home equity borrowing 
options. For HECMs, this is primarily due to the up-front mortgage insurance premium charged 
by HUD, which is currently set at two percent of the value of the home.19 Yet it is not clear that 
the mortgage insurance premium is excessive, or that it is driving down demand for HECMs.  
In an analysis of reverse mortgage costs, Davidoff (2012) found that the ability of a 
borrower to walk away from negative equity (the ‘put option’ embedded in the HECM) was worth 
more than the cost of the mortgage insurance, if borrowers used the product to the maximum. It 
could be that borrowers do not value the embedded put option, as they typically do not extract all 
remaining equity and default on the loan when house prices fall (Davidoff and Wetzel 2014).  If 
this were the case, then one would expect demand to rise if the mortgage insurance premium were 
reduced or eliminated. Yet from 2010 through 2013, there was little demand for a ‘Saver’ version 
of the HECM product with a negligible up-front mortgage insurance premium. This does not imply 
that high up-front costs might not be part of the equation for low demand, but it certainly does not 
seem to be the driving factor. In a survey of older homeowners who considered but did not 
originate a reverse mortgage, 26 percent indicated high costs being a factor behind their decision: 
the same proportion that indicated a desire to leave their home as a bequest as a reason for not 




Another possibility is that the interest rate charged to borrowers is too high, with the spread 
between the cost of credit to the lender ranging between one and three percent (Lucas 2015). But 
as noted in the previous section, interest rates on reverse mortgages, including the ongoing 
mortgage insurance premium, were quite similar to those on other more commonly used traditional 
mortgage products, including HELOCs, cash-out or straight refinancings, and purchase mortgages. 
As well, borrowers in in traditional mortgages paid closing costs that ranged from zero (HELOC) 
to two percent (cash-out refi) of total proceeds. Reverse mortgage origination costs are much 
higher, especially because they include an up-front mortgage insurance premium charged by the 
FHA equal to two percent of the maximum claim amount (home value) plus an origination fee that 
is capped at $2,500 to $6,000, depending on home value. 
To do an apples-to-apples comparison of the impact of higher up-front charges on the total 
cost of the mortgage, we added the up-front cost to the mortgage balance and then computed the 
increase in the imputed interest rate required to pay those costs over the life of the loan (assumed 
to be 12 years). A similar calculation is often presented to borrowers at closing, called the TALC 
(total annual loan cost). While HMDA does not report the actual value of the closing costs and the 
origination fee charged, we ran two scenarios, one with a higher rate (4.75%) plus maximum 
charges for the origination fee, and a second scenario with a lower rate (3.0%) and no origination 
fee. In both cases, the mortgage borrower would also pay a 0.5 percent annual mortgage insurance 
premium. In the case of the high rate loan, the cost increased from 5.3 to 6.6 percent, an increase 
of 1.3 percentage points. For the low-cost loan, the rate increased from about 3.5 to 4.1 percent, 
about 0.6 percentage points per year. 
By comparison, in the UK, where in 2019 equity release mortgages represented about 36 




percent versus a rate of 2.66 percent on a 75 percent LTV 10-year fixed rate mortgage, an annual 
spread of almost 2.6 percent (before considering any difference in origination costs for an equity 
release mortgage). From 2017 to 2019, that spread was nearly constant, even as the equity release 
market grew 32 percent. So higher costs of equity release, at least in the UK, were not an 
appreciable impairment to much faster growth than in the US. 
Aside from the costs of reverse mortgages, other barriers to demand include lack of 
accurate information about how reverse mortgages work, combined with generally negative 
product perceptions. In a survey of a random sample of older adults in the US population, Davidoff, 
Gerhard, and Post (2017) found older adults were generally aware of reverse mortgages but had 
inaccurate information about how they worked. For example, only 56 percent answered correctly 
that the borrower can stay in the home if the loan balance exceeds the value of the home. Their 
results also indicated a significant and positive relationship between having accurate knowledge 
of the product and the stated intention to use a reverse mortgage in the future.  
According to a Fannie Mae National Housing Survey (2016), 49 percent of homeowners 
age 55+ were familiar with reverse mortgages, and only six percent of homeowners indicated 
preferring reverse mortgages to extract equity. Twenty percent of the homeowners who were 
familiar with reverse mortgages reported that the risk of being scammed was their biggest concern 
about reverse mortgages.  
Further, lending to an aging population where death is often the way that the mortgage 
resolves, creates the potential for headline risk, exacerbating negative public perceptions and 
discouraging larger institutional actors from participating in the market. A 2018 industry survey 
of lending institutions indicated that reputational risk was the leading reason that certain banks did 




threat of evicting a borrower while alive, such as for failure to pay property taxes (preventative 
servicing), good communication with heirs, etc.  
Of course, there is also one other appreciable common factor in the UK growth after 2012 
and in the US up to 2011: the impact of large brand-name financial institutions selling reverse 
mortgages. In the US, during the growth and in peak years, banks such as Wells Fargo, Bank of 
America, and BNY Mellon, as well as the insurance company MetLife, were in the reverse 
mortgage business. In the UK, large, brand-name insurers and asset managers such as Aviva, Legal 
and General, and Canada Life, sell equity release products. In addition, in the UK, financial 
planners may also sell (and earn commissions from) reverse mortgages as long as they have an 
appropriate license, which American financial planners almost never obtain. In the US, the exit 
from the market of brand-name financial services firms was followed by an appreciable decline in 
originations of the HECM product. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined the usage of reverse mortgages among mortgage borrowers age 
62+, as well as rejected applicants for new mortgage credit, of the same age. We find that 17 to 27 
percent of actual and rejected borrowers would likely have qualified for a HECM, depending on 
the interest rate and closing costs. This group of 301,000 to 460,000 borrowers is nine to 14 times 
the size of the actual HECM market. These potential borrowers chose another product (or were 
rejected from their preferred product) despite having very high debt-to-income ratios of 36 to more 
than 50 percent for half or more of the sample. Among seniors with an existing mortgage, at least 




The existence of a large number of seniors with an existing mortgage or taking out new 
mortgages with quite high LTVs (an average of 55 to 78% combined LTV, depending on the 
product) suggests that many seniors do, in fact, utilize home equity in order to fund their 
retirement. However, they choose products that require monthly payments that last decades into 
retirement and rise as a share of (falling) income as they get older. Of course, the puzzle remains 
for home equity as for other savings, as to why seniors enter retirement with fewer assets than the 
life cycle model would predict and spend less in retirement than the model implies would be 
optimal. 
We consider a number of possible explanations for why American seniors do not use 
reverse mortgages to spend home equity and instead rely on loans with high required monthly 
payments, including precautionary savings for health shocks, bequest motives, high costs of 
reverse mortgages, and the lack of brand name institutions in the reverse mortgage business. We 
show that equity release products have exhibited enormous growth in the last decade in Canada 
and the UK, the latter of which has an active market that includes large insurance companies. In 
the US, the reverse mortgage market hit its peak at a time when brand name financial institutions 
sold the product to the public. Thus, it appears that institutional barriers that discourage entry by 
brand name companies may be an important factor limiting the distribution of reverse mortgages 
in the US.  
Of course, this then raises the question as to why these companies do not enter the reverse 
mortgage business. One possibility is the negative reputation of reverse mortgages, which may 
discourage companies sensitive to their brands. Policies by the US government in the HECM 
program that require foreclosures as a way to resolve the failure to pay taxes and insurance suggest 




defaults are nearly non-existent. In the US, regulation also restricts financial planners or insurers 
from selling reverse mortgages without obtaining a mortgage origination license. Such licensing 
is time consuming, expensive, and has potential legal risks associated with cross-selling different 
products. In the future, the continued rise of fee-based planners who are paid for advice rather than 
product sales could spur planners to consider home equity as part of the planning process. Finally, 
the adoption of a fiduciary or ‘best interest’ standard might also move planners to consider housing 
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1 See, for example, Brown et al. (2020); Goodman et. al. (2017); Lusardi et al. (2017, 2020); and 
Mayer (2017). 
2 Authors’ calculations using the 1992-2016 Survey of Consumer Finances in 2016 dollars 
(Goodman et al. 2017). 
3 See Haurin et al. (2019) and Goodman et al. (2017). 
4 In one survey (EBRI 2019), eight in 10 workers reported that they expected to work in 
retirement, but only 28 percent of retirees actually work for pay. 
5 While we do not have formal data, equity release issuance in Australia has declined in recent 
years as some larger banks exited the market. Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have 
small markets with fewer than five lenders. Norway has between five and 10 lenders (Ernst and 
Young (EY) 2020). 
6 We report some data on private-label reverse mortgages in the empirical work that follows for 
2018. 
7 The Maximum Claim Amount is subject to a cap, which was $679,650 in 2018, but lower in 
previous years. 
8 Data on the UK from Equity Release Council, 2018 and 2019 market reports. 
9 Approximately 600,000 HECMs are outstanding today out of approximately 26 m elderly 
homeowners age 65+. Adding in those 62-64 likely lowers the number by about 10 percent. 
10 These new reporting requirements were added by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
through a 2015 HMDA Rule that amended Regulation C (HMDA’s implementing legislation). 
The new reporting requirements first went into effect with the 2018 HMDA data release. Not all 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
lenders are required to report under HMDA, with exemptions for smaller institutions and those 
originating a small number of loans in the prior two years (CFPB 2019). 
11 A small number of proprietary reverse mortgages are offered to borrowers age 60+, but these 
private-label products were quite rate in 2018 and available in at most a handful of states. 
12 An estimated eight percent of all homes in 2019 according authors calculations using data 
from Zillow. 
13 While the FHA data indicates that 41,690 HECM loans were endorsed by HUD in 2018, the 
number originated in 2018 is smaller (endorsements typically occur one to two months after 
closing). Based on a one-month lag between loan closing and endorsement, we estimate that 
about 37,000 HECM loans closed during the 2018 calendar year. The 2018 HMDA data thus 
represents about 85 percent of HECM loans closed. 
14 To correct for HMDA reporting errors, we merged in the PLF from HUD data using the 
borrower’s age and interest rate in HMDA. If the lender reported loan amount/(property value or 
loan limit) was 0.10 percentage points smaller or larger than the PLF, we replaced the lender 
reported loan amount with an estimated IPL using the HUD PLF. This resulted in the 
replacement of about 26 percent of reported HECM loan amounts in the 2018 HMDA data. Most 
of the replaced loan amounts were much smaller than the IPL, and likely reflected misreporting 
the loan amount as the initial draw amount rather than the IPL.     
15 This is called a Life Expectancy Set Aside (LESA) and is used by between five and 10 percent 
of HECM borrowers. 
16 HUD sets the maximum lender origination fee to be two percent of the first $200,000 of 
property value or $2,500 (whichever is greater), plus one percent of additional property value 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
17 Closing costs vary widely by state and mortgage amount and can be higher in states with a 
mortgage recording tax, for example, in Florida. 
18 The characteristics are quite similar for those who would have qualified at the 3.0 and 4.75 
rate groups, so we presented the former group to economize on tables. Results available for the 
4.75 group upon request. 
19 The lender origination fee of $2,500 to $6,000 is another potential up-front cost. However, this 
is negotiable, and can be reduced or eliminated depending on the market and the circumstances 





Figure 1. HECM Endorsements by Calendar Year, Median Principal Limit Factor (LTV) 
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Median Principal Limit Factor (LTV)




Figure 2: 2018 Denied HMDA Applications by Age Loan Type, Reason for Denial 











































































































































HMDA Applications 2018, Reasons for Denial




Figure 3: 2018 Denied HMDA Applications by Age and Loan Type, % with Debt to Income 
Ratio > 41% 









































































































































































Application Status           
Originated 0.562 0.776 0.646 0.487 0.465 0.502 0.661 0.530 
Number of Originated Loans 28,946 1,952 1,952 274,388 334,791 268,210 419,266 1,330,342 
Denied 0.167 0.075 0.128 0.365 0.245 0.237 0.118 0.236 
Withdrawn or Incomplete 0.271 0.15 0.18 0.148 0.29 0.261 0.221 0.234 
N 51,493 2,517 3,021 563,653 720,251 534,572 634,573 2,510,080 
Reason for Denial           
Credit history 0.088 0.074 0.062 0.407 0.296 0.273 0.322 0.33 
Debt to income ratio 0.05 0.048 0.026 0.506 0.303 0.388 0.376 0.397 
Collateral 0.394 0.207 0.474 0.186 0.186 0.172 0.124 0.178 
Insufficient cash 0.262 0.112 0.171 0.012 0.022 0.026 0.077 0.03 
Credit application incomplete 0.218 0.362 0.073 0.037 0.173 0.13 0.109 0.109 
Other reasons 0.157 0.223 0.334 0.164 0.173 0.191 0.227 0.18 
N 8,574 188 386 205,922 176,391 126,737 75,189 593,387 
Notes: Sample is restricted to loans for single family, owner-occupied properties where the applicant or co-applicant 
is age 62 or older, excluding investment properties and second homes. 
 

























Loan amount (IPL for reverse mortgage) 165,751 174,918 703,735 108,915 206,545 179,065 228,399 
Property value 358,011 362,701 1,655,046 433,561 393,734 426,760 342,161 
Combined loan to value ratio 0.478 0.486 0.437 0.55 0.63 0.565 0.78 
Loan to value ratio for this loan 0.479 0.486 0.437 0.304 0.625 0.509 0.774 
Interest rate 4.789 4.603 6.513 5.93 5.07 5.335 5.346 
Interest rate spread . . . 0.398 0.634 0.236 0.624 
Total loan costs . . . 322 4,762 3,335 4,513 
Percent reporting total loan costs . . . 7.1% 93.2% 57.4% 91.8% 
Origination charges . . . 77 2,276 1,708 1,529 
Discount points if non-zero . . . 246 2,361 2,189 1,509 
Percent reporting non-zero discount points . . . 0.4% 52.8% 38.2% 31.7% 
Lender credits if non-zero . . . 386 738 835 821 
Percent reporting lender credits . . . 27.7% 34.7% 38.4% 38.3% 
Loan term (months) . . . 304 305 298 340 
Percent with loan term 360+ months     59.0% 70.5% 57.9% 88.3% 
FHA or VA 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.1% 25.9% 9.5% 25.4% 
Black or Hispanic 15.0% 10.2% 10.2% 10.5% 15.8% 12.7% 15.3% 
Missing race and ethnicity 5.3% 2.9% 5.4% 7.6% 13.3% 9.4% 8.2% 
Borrower gender: single female 39.6% 33.1% 40.8% 22.1% 22.8% 22.4% 23.5% 
Borrower gender: single male 23.7% 16.4% 37.4% 19.1% 22.7% 20.2% 22.3% 
Borrower gender: joint female and male 35.8% 48.9% 20.1% 53.1% 44.8% 50.4% 48.2% 
Borrower gender: missing 1.0% 1.6% 1.6% 5.7% 9.6% 7.1% 6.0% 
Percent with co-applicant 38.8% 54.8% 42.4% 59.7% 53.6% 57.9% 58.9% 
DTI<36% . . . 46.3% 35.7% 47.1% 36.2% 
DTI 36-41% . . . 20.5% 21.2% 19.2% 21.6% 
DTI >41% . . . 33.2% 43.1% 33.7% 42.1% 
Income used for underwriting 29.352 42.268 42.021 118.844 113.332 127.145 173.91 
Census tract % minority 34.16 25.803 35.768 24.407 30.886 26.432 27.085 
MSA median family income 74,384 71,966 93,472 76,089 74,257 75,282 71,573 
Census tract income to MSA income % 107.391 115.877 158.244 120.203 112.34 117.008 113.559 
Observations 28,946 1,952 1,952 274,388 334,791 268,210 419,266 
Notes: The summary statistics are based on lender reported values, where values not reported are treated as missing. An 
exception is the loan amount (IPL) and LTV, where we estimate an age and interest rate adjusted PLF and replace values 
where the loan amount/maximum claim amount is not within 0.10 of the PLF, this resulting in replacement of 26% of the 
values. The sample sizes are smaller for particular variables with missing data or outliers.  
 




Table 3: Counterfactual Simulations, HECM Feasibility by Loan Type, 2018 HMDA Applicants Age 62+  






















Simulation 1: 4.75 Interest Rate and Origination Fee          
Estimated HECM PLF 0.457 0.457 0.457 0.443 0.459 0.462 0.461 0.438 
Estimated HECM IPL 158,258 144,783 148,158 127,795 156,563 130,180 144,288 92,721 
Estimated HECM Origination Fee 4,711 4,533 4,498 4,338 4,586 4,177 4,322 3,314 
Estimated HECM Initial Mortgage Insurance Premium 6,951 6,371 6,510 5,801 6,834 5,644 6,268 4,260 
Estimated HECM Total Up Front Costs 14,162 13,405 13,508 12,639 13,920 12,321 13,090 10,074 
Existing Mortgage Debt to be Paid off with HECM 112,196 14,379 36,936 22,018 122,386 8,735 40,108 19,223 
Estimated Total Loan Amount with HECM 236,684 237,411 231,172 268,110 240,377 228,244 245,778 255,167 
Estimated HECM loan to value or MCA 0.643 0.715 0.665 0.859 0.68 0.798 0.748 0.952 
Could Obtain HECM 0.282 0.161 0.252 0.064 0.259 0.112 0.177 0.029 
HECM PLF less Estimated HECM LTV -0.186 -0.259 -0.208 -0.416 -0.221 -0.335 -0.287 -0.514 
Shortfall for HECM -0.324 -0.335 -0.327 -0.453 -0.36 -0.397 -0.38 -0.533 
          
Simulation 2: 3.0 Interest Rate and No Origination Fee          
Estimated HECM PLF 0.555 0.555 0.555 0.542 0.557 0.56 0.559 0.538 
Estimated HECM IPL 192,299 175,992 180,052 156,499 190,044 157,779 174,970 113,917 
Estimated HECM Initial Mortgage Insurance Premium 6,951 6,371 6,510 5,801 6,834 5,644 6,268 4,260 
Estimated HECM Total Up Front Costs 9,451 8,871 9,010 8,301 9,334 8,144 8,768 6,760 
Existing Mortgage Debt to be Paid off with HECM 112,196 14,379 36,936 22,018 122,386 8,735 40,108 19,223 
Estimated Total Loan Amount with HECM 231,969 232,877 226,666 263,717 235,761 224,038 241,414 251,354 
Estimated HECM loan to value or MCA 0.627 0.699 0.649 0.843 0.664 0.781 0.732 0.935 
Could Obtain HECM 0.395 0.268 0.38 0.12 0.356 0.189 0.282 0.058 
HECM PLF less Estimated HECM LTV -0.072 -0.144 -0.094 -0.301 -0.107 -0.221 -0.173 -0.397 
Shortfall for HECM -0.26 -0.261 -0.267 -0.362 -0.292 -0.313 -0.313 -0.43 
N 274,388 334,791 268,210 419,266 205,922 176,391 126,737 75,189 
Source: Authors’ calculations from 2018 HMDA data   
  
Table 4: Summary Characteristics of 2018 HMDA Applicants, Would Qualify for HECM at 3.0 Rate  
  Originated Denied 























Estimated HECM Total Up Front Costs 14,367 14,367 14,043 14,614 9,443 9,056 9,705 9,292 
Mortgage Debt to be Paid off with HECM 28,151 2,886 9,426 1,199 29,820 2,840 12,106 2,074 
Estimated Loan Amount with HECM 121,877 137,240 126,119 146,099 116,158 127,654 136,829 140,483 
Estimated HECM loan to value or MCA 0.352 0.393 0.378 0.416 0.341 0.394 0.391 0.419 
Reasons for Denial          
Reason for Denial: Credit History     0.453 0.31 0.279 0.18 
Reason for Denial: Debt to Income     0.489 0.33 0.448 0.391 
Select HMDA Characteristics          
Loan amount (or IPL for reverse mortgage) 84,159 124,789 107,360 135,290 76,895 115,757 115,018 129,116 
Property value 392,938 387,937 378,220 366,373 411,596 362,212 414,666 367,910 
Combined loan to value ratio 0.303 0.346 0.33 0.375 0.291 0.345 0.341 0.373 
Loan to value ratio for this loan 0.243 0.345 0.313 0.379 0.229 0.345 0.321 0.377 
Interest rate 4.933 4.596 4.402 4.548 . . . . 
Interest rate spread 0.212 0.593 0.157 0.361 . . . . 
Total loan costs 266 2,916 2,151 3,259 . . . . 
Percent reporting total loan costs 0.048 0.954 0.488 0.973 0 0 0 0 
Black or Hispanic 0.101 0.141 0.099 0.079 0.262 0.219 0.192 0.143 
Borrower gender: single female 0.273 0.294 0.264 0.262 0.366 0.323 0.339 0.307 
Borrower gender: single male 0.186 0.201 0.178 0.146 0.289 0.319 0.273 0.214 
Borrower gender: joint female and male 0.489 0.424 0.499 0.537 0.299 0.268 0.313 0.389 
DTI <36% 0.528 0.476 0.545 0.536 0.259 0.318 0.26 0.308 
DTI 36-41% 0.178 0.201 0.167 0.183 0.08 0.116 0.087 0.106 
DTI >41% 0.294 0.323 0.288 0.281 0.66 0.566 0.653 0.586 
Income used for underwriting 85.339 95.983 81.46 172.578 63.702 57.666 58.215 65.481 
Census tract % minority 24.953 30.44 24.762 22.963 37.041 35.772 33.29 24.814 
MSA median family income 76,359 75,855 76,507 73,423 75,945 73,784 77,235 66,359 
Census tract income to MSA income % 118.7 114.5 118.2 121.3 110.9 107.6 113.2 105.7 
Observations 106,016 84,555 93,595 46,277 66,973 29,539 30,927 2,869 
Source: Authors’ calculations from 2018 HMDA data 
 
